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Leveraged Buyouts: 
Opportunities and Risks 
by 
Elisa S. Moncarz 
Associate Professor 
School of Hospitality Management 
Florida International University 
This article presents a general overview of leveraged buyouts, relating their 
feasibility as an option for hospitality management. Specifically, the author 
explores the background and main features of leveraged buyouts, focus- 
ing attention on their risks and rewards, management's opportunities, tax 
ramifications, planning, and future outlook. Denny's leveraged buyout is 
examined in order to provide an insight into the structuring of a buyout for 
a major food service firm. 
Leveraged buyouts have received increased attention as a business 
strategy in the past few years. They have become "one of the most 
successful and certainly most creative ways to purchase corporate 
assets,"' and have been described by some observers as the corporate 
trend of the '80s, providing a unique opportunity for management to 
own and operate a business. 
Although the hospitality industry has not actively participated in 
the leveraged buyout boom, the recent execution of the buyouts of 
Denny's, Inc and ARA Services, Inc leads to speculation on the likeli- 
hood that leveraged buyouts might become a trend in the hospitality 
industry. Surely, "the Denny's deal is the first big test of whether the 
restaurant industry can participate successfully in leveraged buyouts."* 
A leveraged buyout (LBO), also called management buyout, occurs 
when a private consortium of management, investment bankers, and 
institutional investors borrows money to purchase a company from pub- 
lic shareholders or from a parent company. "By using mainly borrowed 
funds and putting a little of their own equity, managers are entering 
the world of entrepreneurship."3 In a LBO the investor group that 
includes the management of the company to be acquired takes the com- 
pany private in a transaction largely financed by borrowings. Ulti- 
mately, the debt is repaid with funds generated by the acquired 
company's operations or the sale of assets. 
"A well conceived, planned and executed leveraged buyout can give 
an opportunity for significant capital appreciation in a relatively short 
period of time114 When it works, it pays off handsomely for all con- 
cerned. While entrepreneurial executives obtain a chance to own a com- 
pany, stockholders are paid a premium for their shares, and deal 
organizers get fees and a share of profits. 
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As previously noted, LBOs are heavily financed with debt. Finan- 
cial institutions and other outside sources typically provide between 
70 and 90 percent of the purchase price. Equity contributions are nor- 
mally kept low to achieve the greater upside appreciation and return 
on investment. 'The net effect is that debt is used to retire equity, which 
is known as leveraging up a company's capitalization.115 "It is not unusual 
for the debt to equity ratio of a company to be more than 10 to 1 after 
a LB01'6 A leveraged takeover (or institutional buyout) is distinguished 
from a leveraged buyout in that in a takeover the company is acquired 
by a group of professional investors who are outsiders, whereas in a 
leveraged buyout certain members of management acquire the com- 
pany, division, or subsidiary they are currently managing. 
LBOs Are Not New Phenomenon 
Although LBOs have been receiving a considerable amount of atten- 
tion lately, the leveraged buyout concept has been around for over 20 
years when it was known as "b~otstrapping.~' General Electric Credit 
Corporation has been a main purveyor of financing for LBOs for the 
past 20 years, and has thus been regarded as a pioneer in this area. 
Prudential Insurance Company has also been involved in LBOs since 
the early '60s. 
Opportunities became abundantly apparent for LBOs in the latter 
half of the '60s when the conglomerates found themselves flooded with 
acquisitions. Often they wished to sell pieces of the larger companies 
they acquired in order to improve group, divisional, or company struc- 
tures. The first investment banking firm to take notice of the poten- 
tial rewards of LBOs was Gibbsons, Green and Rice. In 1976, Kohlberg, 
Kravis, Roberts and Company was formed and became "the undisputed 
leader in the fieldyy7 of LBO specialists. Until 1979 most of the LBO 
deals were valued at less than $100,000 and thus were too small to 
be of interest to large investment banking firms. By 1982, however, 
the total LBO deals amounted to $2.4 billion, accounting for 13 per- 
cent of all corporate divestitures. As a result, many investment banks 
began to notice the LBO boom and opened separate departments dedi- 
cated to providing assistance and planning for LBOs. 
Over the past few years, "a vigorous economic recovery, combined 
with relatively low interest and inflation rates and increasing corporate 
cash flow and liquidity, has encouraged a rising tide of leveraged buy- 
outs.ll* In the period from January 1 to October 12, 1984, there were 
62 LBOs amounting to $13.5 billion, compared to 30 LBOs amount- 
ing to $6 billion in the same period in 1983, according to Securities 
Data. 
Buyouts Require The Restructuring Of Corporate Ownership 
A major feature of a LBO is that the equity capital (ownership) is 
shared between the managers and the outside investors who help 
finance the acquisition of publicly-held stock. The great appeal to the 
investor-manager is that he or she changes from an employee to an 
entrepreneur. 
Qpically, an investment firm engineers the deal by putting together 
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the buying group, which is comprised of outside investors and certain 
members of the company's management. The investor group is 
interested in purchasing the company with little equity and a great 
deal of debt, secured by the company's assets. The idea is to complete 
the buyout with funds raised from pledging or selling existing assets 
of the purchased company. 
Financing for an LBO is often complex and many-faceted. Banks 
and insurance companies provide the bulk of the required debt financ- 
ing. They generally require assets such as property and equipment, 
inventories, or receivables as collateral for their loans. Due to the risk 
factor, loans are offered in significant excess over prime rate, often 
through bridge financing and remortgaging. Other financing sources 
include small business investment companies, venture capitalists, fed- 
eral and state government agencies, and employee stock ownership 
plans. Also, pension funds have provided a considerable amount of 
equity capital for buyout deals. 
Immediately after the buyout is completed, there is a restructuring 
of corporate ownership by replacing the entire public stock interest 
with full equity ownership by the private investor group. Managers 
will generally share subsequent equity ownership with outside private 
investors who helped finance the LBO. 
The return to private ownership (going private) "potentially yields 
material reductions in registrations, listing, and other stockholder ser- 
vicing  cost^."^ Private companies have more freedom in their decision- 
making process. "Business decisions are addressed solely from their 
economic viewpoint without regard to the potential impact on earn- 
ings per sharel'10 Implicit in this argument is that once private, the 
company can manage its business in its best long-term interests rather 
than on the short-run orientation of the stock market. That is, with- 
out public shareholders, managers are able to concentrate more on 
long-term goals. 
Frequently LBOs are structured as mergers. In that event, the pub- 
lic firm is usually combined with a shell corporation created expressly 
for the purpose of going private. "Under the merger agreement the 
stockholders of the shell corporation (the incumbent management 
group) become the sole equity owners of the surviving firm. The pub- 
lic stockholders must surrender their shares and receive cash in return. 
Stockholders of the public firm must vote to approve the merger."ll 
If the buyout turns out to be a successful venture, the company can 
retire the debt within five to 10 years. The investor group can then 
realize large returns by reselling the company, In many instances, "the 
company goes public again, sometimes scoring a second success in the 
new issues market."12 It is not unreasonable to expect annual returns 
of 40 or 50 percent. In extraordinary cases, larger returns have been 
achieved. 
Prime Ingredients For Successful LBOs 
LBOs are not suitable for all types of companies. Promising candi- 
dates for LBOs among hospitality firms will share many of the fol- 
lowing characteristics: 
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Strong and competent management team expected to stay once 
the transaction is completed. Essentially, continuity of manage- 
ment has been regarded as a basic ingredient for a successful LBO. 
High cash generators, thereby facilitating the repayment of the 
new debt. 
Limited outstanding debt which permits the addition of signifi- 
cant additional borrowings. 
Undervalued assets which also allow the payment of a premium 
to selling shareholders and a purchase at a reasonable price. 
Stable earnings growth. Although the company does not need to 
be highly profitable, it must have some fundamental strength to 
build on so that competent management will be able to comforta- 
bly service the debt. 
It is crucial to maintain earnings at projected levels during the period 
of time that it will take to bring the debt ratio to a more manageable 
position. Ideal candidates for LBOs are undervalued companies that 
have low debt, large and steady cash flows, and prospects for stable 
earnings growth. 
The key in identifying potential opportunities for LBOs in the hospi- 
tality industry requires a full appreciation of the reasons why a com- 
pany or division is being sold or divested. The main circumstances in 
which LBOs arise are: 
Public companies that are trading at prices below their net asset 
values. Management-investors take the company private in a LBO. 
Indeed, the most difficult LBO is taking a public company private 
because of the shareholders' concern for receiving a fair price. 
Divestitures of divisions that no longer fit the corporate strate- 
gies of the public companies that own them. Management wants 
to divest resources by spinning off unwanted divisions. 
Private companies in which the owner is near retirement (or per- 
haps intends to pursue other interests). 
Situations in which there is a threat of hostile takeover attempts. 
Instances in which the board of directors might be frustrated with 
dissident shareholders. 
LBOs Have Tax Advantages 
A favored aspect of LBOS is their current tax treatment. Actually, 
"Uncle Sam has subsidized the leveraged buyout business"13 through 
liberalized depreciation rules included in the tax code. Most LBOs pay 
little or no income taxes in the first few years after conversion as a 
result of the increased depreciation charges based on the new higher 
book value of the assets written up. Also, the interest on the borrowed 
money, in contrast to dividends, is tax deductible and thus shelters 
earnings. 
Since private companies are not required to report earnings for public 
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shareholders, they can make the fullest use of the liberalized depreci- 
ation deductions included in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
as recently amended. The augmented cash flow derived from the tax 
savings can then be used to service and retire the large debt incurred 
during the buyout. 
A recent provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (TRA) provides 
an added tax incentive affecting LBOs. According to TRA, "banks and 
other commercial lenders will be able to exclude from taxable income 
50 percent of the income received on loans to Employees Stock Options 
Plans (ESOP)1'14 These lenders are expected to pass on some of these 
tax savings to the ESOP, thereby encouraging a new form of LBO 
by making these plans an inexpensive way to finance the buyout. 
Management Opportunities Exist 
LBOs provide a unique opportunity for talented managers to own 
and operate the business they are currently managing. Experts have 
indicated that this opportunity might result in "the revitalization of 
the chief executive by becoming a mature entrepreneur."15 
Entrepreneurs often take a different view of the world of profes- 
sional managers. They have stronger beliefs in property rights and 
in managing for the long term. "Entrepreneurial managers can make 
small units grow more rapidly and take advantages of market niches.1116 
The whole emphasis is on management involvement and motivation 
since owner-managers stand to benefit more. They become more com- 
mitted, deriving increased productivity for the company. Experience 
also indicates that buyouts enable managers to be compensated in ways 
that would be quite difficult to carry out in a publicly-owned company. 
The likelihood of receiving "bonus plans that give managers as much 
as 100 percent of company profits above some target profit figure may 
also yield strong productivity gains for some companies."17 
Moreover, productivity gains can also be achieved because "LBOs 
replace passive public investors with sophisticated institutional inves- 
tors who have strong financial interest in the future profitability of 
the c~mpany."'~ These institutional investors will normally monitor 
the operation of the private company following the buyout through 
representation on the board of directors. 
LBOs Do Have Risks 
LBOs have been very attractive for all parties involved as a result 
of the prospects for spectacular returns. For investors putting equity 
money into buyouts, returns on investments of over 40 percent have 
not been uncommon. While allowing corporate managers to become 
corporate owners, selling shareholders usually receive a generous 
premium above the current market value of their stock. At the same 
time, deal organizers receive hefty fees and a percentage of profits. 
Buyouts have also helped some corporations shed unwanted divisions 
for premium prices. 
Still, despite the potential for impressive returns, LBOs involve sub- 
stantial risk. Once the LBO is completed, the company is deep in debt. 
"The greater the leverage, the greater the risks to the company, its 
shareholders, and ~reditors.~"~ The risk is further magnified "when 
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debt is short-term and tied to prime rate fluctuations as is much of 
the debt provided in LBO  situation^."^^ Rvo unknowns can jeopardize 
the company's existence: an economy downturn and a significant rise 
in interest rates. "A movement of 3 to 4 points in the prime rate or 
a credit squeeze may be enough to place the future of a marginal LBO 
in je~pardy."~' 
Recently, government officials have expressed concern about the 
undue risks of LBOs by voicing their warnings and questioning their 
wisdom. Paul A. Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, 
warned in June 1984 that "LBO transactions could give the acquired 
company excessive debt," placing too heavy a demand on cash flows. 
Similarly, SEC chairman John Shad warned "the more leveraged 
takeovers and buyouts today, the more bankruptcies tomorrow0 Once 
a company has balanced the rewards and risks associated with LBOs 
and decided to follow the LBO route, certain steps need to be 
implemented in planning a successful plan of action: 
Perform sufficient modeling of alternative interest rates and busi- 
ness conditions in order to evaluate the chances of success. 
Analyze accounting and tax consequences. 
Exercise extreme caution in the selection of professionals, which 
should include: 
lawyers: They will play a key role in structuring acquisition and 
debt agreements and in the negotiating process. 
accountants: They will provide tax advice and will assist in the 
preparation and analysis of financial statements. 
investment bankers: Those experienced in LBOs will provide 
advice and assistance in obtaining financing. 
appraisers: They will assist in the determination of the collateral 
value of property and equipment. 
The main objective to keep in mind is to structure a financing pack- 
age that not only enables the buyout, but also permits adequate cash 
flow to fund current and future operating needs. 
Future Outlook For LBOs 
Despite the recent LBO boom, it appears that LBOs have cooled down 
a bit after reaching a peak in 1984. Lenders and investors have become 
more wary of buyouts, making it more difficult to raise money and 
line up investors. Also, many LBOs have become overpriced; hence the 
economies of these deals might no longer be acceptable for investors. 
LBOs have been subject to criticism from government officials and 
others about their undue risks as well as management's gains coming 
at the expense of public shareholders. This latter contention was dis- 
proved by a recent study conducted by Harry deAngelo, Linda 
deAngelo, and Edward Rice, which concluded that buyouts are rather 
beneficial to public shareholders. The study revealed that in a typical 
situation, the public shareholders' offer "involved a price that was 56 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 3, Number 2, 1985
Copyright: Contents © 1985 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial, or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission
from the publisher.
percent above the market value prior to the initial offer."22 
Another issue that might affect the future environment for LBOs 
is the role that buyouts are expected to play as a defensive maneuver 
to halt an all-time high hostile takeover trend. To this end, "there are 
definite signs that LBOs may soon form the arsenal of standard defense 
measures that have been dreamed by investment banks to replace 
unfriendly bidders,"23 better known as corporate raiders. Future trends 
are clearly toward the continuation of LBOs as long as the potential 
for substantial wealth remains a strong incentive for all participants. 
The tax system is also expected to preserve the favored treatment of 
LBOs, encouraging their future growth. Further, conglomerates are 
divesting themselves of unwanted units, "offering them to their 
managers as part of the unwinding of the merger and acquisition craze 
of the past decade."24 This provides a unique opportunity for the hospi- 
tality industry since some conglomerates are currently re-evaluating 
their commitments to food service chains and some have publicly 
announced their plans to sell their food service divisions. 
Denny's, Inc. Has Buyout 
Denny's, Inc has been engaged in the food service business primar- 
ily through the development, management, and operation of full-service 
restaurants (coffee-shop division), donut houses (Winchell's division), 
and quick service, Mexican-style, char-broiled chicken restaurants (El 
Pollo Loco division). Denny's sales volume had placed it in first place 
in the coffee shop and family restaurant segment, significantly ahead 
of other competitors. 
On January 24, 1985, Denny's shareholders approved an LBO offer 
of $43 a share (or about $734.2 million) at a special meeting of share- 
holders in La Mirada, California, "a transaction that is of a magni- 
tude unprecedented in the food service industry."25 
Originally proposed by Merrill Lynch Capital Markets (Merrill 
in May 1984 after being consulted by Denny's on the feasi- 
bility of disposing of its Winchell's Donut Houses division,27 the Denny's 
LBO was expected to be finalized in three to five months. However, 
the private investor group led by Merrill Lynch was unable to line up 
all the required financing to support the original offer of $45 a share, 
delaying the consummation of the buyout until January 1985. At the 
same time, "the price to be paid to Denny's shareholders was cut to 
$43 a share from $45 a share,"28 resulting in a reduction in the value 
of the LBO deal to $734.2 million from $787 million. 
The Denny's buyout was structured as a merger in which a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of a Delaware-based holding company named DH129 
merged into Denny's. "As a result of the merger, Denny's would become 
a wholly owned subsidiary of the new privately held company - DHI, 
principally owned by certain members of Denny's management, by Mer- 
rill Lynch, and by other financial institutions," according to proxy mate- 
rial sent to Denny's shareholders in advance of the special meeting 
of January 24, 1985, to vote on the proposal. 
The private investor group was comprised of 55 members of Denny's 
senior management led by its president and chief executive officer Vern 
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0. Curtis and by Merrill Lynch and unaffiliated investors. The 55 mem- 
bers of Denny's management team who participated in the LBO 
"acquired 18 percent of Denny's by combining $6.6 million from tax 
free swaps of stock options and cashing in accumulated performance 
bonuses'130 when in fact their own cash investment was only $1.5 mil- 
lion. "Although management's $8.1 million investment accounted for 
18 percent of the company's common stock, it represented $132 mil- 
lion of the $734.2 million value of the transacti~n~"~~ a potential for 
a sizeable return on investment should the company go public at some 
point in the future. 
Individually, Vern 0. Curtis became the biggest management share- 
holder with a 3 percent stake in the company after an investment of 
$1.2 million. On May 25, 1984, the last full day of trading prior to public 
announcement of the proposed LBO, "the reported closing price on 
the New York Exchange (NYSE) composite tape was $32 518 per share 
of Denny's common On September 25, 1984, the last full day 
of trading prior to public announcement of the decline of the original 
offer price to $43 a share, "the reported closing price on the NYSE 
composite tape was $38 per share of Denny's common On 
December 21, 1984, the day the proxy statement was mailed to share- 
holders to vote on the merger, "the reported closing price on the NYSE 
composite tape was $41 314 per share of Denny's common st0~k.l'~~ 
Denny's Was Well-Suited For Buyout 
Denny's was considered to be well-suited for a buyout among restaur- 
ant companies because "it had more than $100 million in cash and 
generated strong cash flows needed to pay off the debt that is the result 
of the Besides, Denny's was a conservative company among 
food service concerns with an attractive record of quality and con- 
sistency in earnings. 
Denny's was an extremely well-managed operation, which had 
experienced tremendous expansion and increased profitability over the 
past several years. Analysts perceived Denny's management team as 
one of the most competent and respected in the restaurant industry. 
Its operational and financial controls were considered among the best. 
Denny's was very strong financially. Its debt as a percentage of total 
assets was a reasonable 55 percent and it was a highly liquid firm. 
The book value per share of Denny's common stock was $19.44 on June 
29, 1984, which was seen as an indication of undervalued assets. A 
special committee of Denny's board of directors that evaluated the fair- 
ness of the $43 per share price paid to Denny's selling shareholders 
indicated that the aforementioned price provided these shareholders 
with an opportunity to receive cash for current investment at a higher 
rate of return than Denny's historical dividend yields. 
Obviously, the most significant amount of funds required to finance 
the buyout came from borrowings, and thus reflected a major increase 
to Denny's debt load of $568.2 million. (See Exhibit 1). The main por- 
tion of debt financing was supplied by Morgan Guaranty of New York 
and Wells Fargo Bank, providing $372.6 million at one point over prime 
rate and $118.7 million at 2.5 points over prime rate (as defined) in 
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the form of revolving credit loans and subordinated floating rate notes 
due at various times through 1997. In addition, Prudential Insurance 
Company provided $60.5 million at 15.5 percent and $16.4 million at 
16.75 percent for senior and subordinated fixed rate notes. The bal- 
ance of the capital needed to finance the Denny's LBO was received 
from the investor group led by Merrill Lynch and from Denny's accumu- 
lated cash balances. For its part, the consortium led by Merrill Lynch 
invested in $35.6 million of preferred stock paying 13 percent dividends 
and purchased 77 percent of the $44.4 million common stock outstand- 
ing. Denny's profit sharing plan also invested in 5 percent of the com- 
mon stock outstanding. 
A breakdown of the ownership interest (common stcck investment) 
with respect to Denny's LBO transaction follows: 
Exhibit 1 
Denny's Leveraged Buyout: 
Sources and Uses of Funds 
In Millions of Dollars 
Sources of funds 
Debt Financing: 
Revolving credit loans 
15.5% senior fixed rate notes 
Subordinated floating rate loans 
16.75% subordinated fixed rate notes 
Total debt financing 
Equity Financing: 
DHI redeemable preferred stock 
DHI common stock 
Total equity 
Denny's existing cash balances 
Total sources 
Uses of funds 
Payment to Denny's shareholders ($43 a share) 
Payment of fees and expenses incurred in 
connection with the merger 
Total uses 
NCYI'E: All the outstanding capital stock of Denny's and substantially of its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries were pledged to secure the payment of the principal and interest relat- 
ing to the debt portion of the financing. 
SOURCE: Denny's Proxy Statement, December 21, 1984. 
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A breakdown of the investments is as follows: 
Amount in Percent 
millions of 
dollars 
Denny's management group $ 8.1 18.2Y0 
Merrill Lynch consortium 34.1 76.8 
Profit sharing plan 
LBOs involve enormous risk for all involved, and Denny's appears 
to be no exception. Denny's buyers added over $560 million of debt 
to the company's capitalization, which resulted in raising the debt bur- 
den to about $792.5 million. Since the buyout also decreased the equity 
base to about $44 million from $312 million, Denny's debt to equity 
ratio was raised from less than 1 to 1 to the excessive level of 18 to 
1 (see Exhibit 2). 
Exhibit 2 
Denny's Leveraged Buyout 
Impact on Capitalization 
In Millions of Dollars 
Long-term debt3 
Long-term notes 
Convertible debentures4 
Obligations under capital leases 
Revolving credit loans 
Senior Fixed Rate Notes 
Subordinated Floating Rate Loans 
Subordinated Fixed Rate Notes 
lbtal Long-term debt 
Preferred Stock 
Common Shareholders' Equity 
Total Capitalization 
Debt to equity ratio 
Denny's 
9/28/84' 
Denny's LBO 
9/28/84 
Proforma2 
1. The quarter ending September 28, 1984, was Denny's last full reporting period before it 
went private. 
2. Proforma capitalization figures give effect to the execution of the leverage buyout pursuant 
to the terms of merger and financing. They also give effect to the sale of the rights to the 
Denny's trademark in Japan to Denny's Japan Ltd. 
3. The consolidated long-term debt of Denny's includes current maturities of $10,596,000. 
4. Denny's called for redemption on Jan. 24, 1985, of all of its outstanding 9112% convertible 
subordinated debentures due October 15,2007, at a redemption price of 107.77% of the prin- 
cipal amount thereof plus accrued interest. 
SOURCE: Denny's, Inc, Proxy Statement, December 21, 1984. 
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"Denny's entered into interest rate swap arrangements to mitigate 
the impact on Denny's of increases in borrowing costs resulting from 
fluctuations in interest rates."36 Nonetheless, interest payments for 
1985 are expected to "exceed $72 million and every one-point rise in 
interest rates could cost the company $5 million."37 Denny's net income 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984, was $45 million on revenue 
of $1.2 billion. As a result of the buyout, however, interest expenses 
on the massive debt would almost eradicate any prospects for increased 
earnings and had been expected to retard Denny's aggressive expan- 
sion program in 1985. ("Denny's 1984 strategic plan without given 
recognition to the LBO estimated the 1985 revenue to be $1.45 bil- 
lion with net income estimated at $54 million.")38 
It is evident that the investor group that acquired Denny's on a LBO 
- not to mention the three primary lenders - stands to incur sub- 
stantial losses if Denny's LBO does not prove successful. It should be 
noted, however, that it is the belief of many analysts that if everything 
goes as planned, profits could pay off most of the principal and interest 
within 10 years. In such a case, should the company become highly 
profitable again, the resale of Denny's to the public would result in 
dramatic returns to the participating management, investors, and Mer- 
rill Lynch. Thus, high stakes are involved in Denny's LBO. Still, if the 
buyout works according to company's expectations, it might prove to 
be extremely rewarding for all concerned. 
Denny's Post-LBO Strategy 
Analysts had predicted that Denny's would slow its past torrid expan- 
sion pace in the aftermath of the LBO to "direct cash flow toward 
accelerated debt service."39 Nonetheless, confronted with the prospects 
that slower expansion could lead to loss of its coffee shop market dom- 
inance, Denny's has "decided to launch a selective program of restau- 
rant fran~hising,"~~ thusreversing a company trend that began in 1970 
which was adverse to the use of franchising as a method of expan- 
sion. By doing so, potential initial franchise fees and continuing sales 
royalties could help to service the huge debt resulting from the buy- 
out. Meanwhile, with the advent of the franchising program, the faster 
growth rate is likely to continue in spite of the LBO. 
Some observers have also pointed out that Denny's 1983 acquisition 
of El Pollo Loco division provided "a growth vehicle that may be 
brought public on its own, creating an exciting public vehicle if deemed 
de~irable."~~ ButDenny's original "vision for El Pollo Loco becoming 
America's pollo chain,"42 which accounted for its building up the chain 
to more than 35 units in California and Tkxas, may have to be reconsi- 
dered. The buyout "has placed enough of a financial strain on the com- 
pany to raise questions whether it can afford to keep rapidly expanding 
El Pollo Loco and whether that would divert critical financing resources 
from Denny's restaurants themselves - still Denny's main growth 
vehicle."43 
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Other LBOs Exist in the Industry 
In addition to Denny's LBO there have been other buyouts floating 
in the hospitality industry over the past year or so. 
ARA Services, Inc, a Philadelphia-based contract feeder, thrilled 
shareholders when 70 top executives took the company private in 
December 1984 in a LBO deal valued at $882.5 million. ARA's selling 
shareholders received $71.75 a share, "a windfall considering ARA's 
price before takeover talk began earlier in 1984 was in the mid-$40'~.''~~ 
As a consequence, the members of management who participated in 
the LBO attained "31 percent ownership of the company, putting up 
2 percent of the capital and borrowing the rest against ARA's assets."45 
Recent reports indicate that ARKS pretax operating earnings for 
the quarter ending March 31, 1985 (the first reporting period as a pri- 
vate company), "rose slightly from $39.7 million in the same period 
of the previous year."46 Yet "net after-tax profits dropped considera- 
bly compared with the $16.2 million of the last year's similar quar- 
ter,"47 reflecting the substantial interest that ARA was paying on the 
buyout debt. 
Conversely, a $525 million LBO plan to buy Chicago-based Diver- 
sifoods, Inc, operators of the Godfather's Pizza chain and franchised 
Burger Kings, was abandoned in 1984. Diversifood's former chief execu- 
tive officer Don Smith and other top executives attempted to take the 
company private in a LBO transaction, but they dropped the offer after 
failing to secure financing in the wake of steady declining earnings. 
This resulted in the forced resignation of Don Smith as head of Diver- 
sifoods. 
As part of a refocusing trend among conglomerates (especially gro- 
cery product companies), "Ralston Purina signed an agreement to sell 
its Foodmaker restaurant subsidiary (operators of Jack-in-the-Box) for 
$500 million to a management group led by Foodmaker's president 
and chief executive officer Jack Goodall in a LBO transa~tion."~~ How- 
ever, the LBO plan fell through because the leaders refused to sup- 
port it due to Foodmaker's declining earnings and unfavorable economic 
conditions in the industry. Another conglomerate that is presently plan- 
ning to sell a number of its restaurant chains is General Mills. 
Reports had also surfaced that Howard Johnson chairman G. Michael 
Hostage was trying to put together a group to buy the hotel and res- 
taurant chain from its parent company, Imperial Group PLC, through 
an But there are several outside bidders who were also show- 
ing interest in acquiring Howard Johnson's. 
Another lodging chain that has been considered a likely candidate 
for an LBO is Hilton Hotels Corp. Investment banking sources had 
been speculating that chairman Barron Hilton may attempt an LBO. 
Analysts who followed Hilton have indicated that "a deal to take the 
company private in a LBO would not be unrea~onable"~~ considering 
that the recent rejection of a Hilton casino license request in Atlantic 
City might "make Hilton's management more amenable to running 
a private company."51 
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Also, the anti-takeover provisions which were intended to thwart hos- 
tile takeover attempts by outsiders and which were approved by Hil- 
ton's shareholders in their annual meeting of May 6, 1985, "would not 
impede a board-approved LBO."52 For this reason, the anti-takeover 
measures appeared to have laid the groundwork and buy time for 
Barron Hilton's management group to structure a possible LBO. For 
the present, "analysts believe Barron Hilton intends to take the com- 
pany private within the next five years through a They see 
the upcoming sale of the Atlantic City casino as "the first step in tak- 
ing the company private"54 since it would enable Hilton to raise funds 
to eventually undertake the buyout. 
Conclusion 
LBOs have experienced remarkable growth in recent years. It is easy 
to see why buyouts have become so popular. They can be rewarding 
for all participants. Equity investors can achieve returns that would 
be unavailable elsewhere with comparable risk. Managers- 
entrepreneurs can receive a unique opportunity to expand their busi- 
ness horizons. Selling shareholders are able to liquify assets that would 
otherwise be tied up, while receiving a premium for their shares. Simi- 
larly, investment bankers and other packagers can receive colossal fees 
and a share of earnings. 
Due to the substantial risks associated with LBOs, there will be buy- 
outs which do not prove successful. But for those that do, the rewards 
could be outstanding for the management team. Moreover, LBOs will 
usually result in significant productivity gains for the new private com- 
pany as well as higher compensation for the owners-managers- 
entrepreneurs. 
Opportunities remain for successful LBOs in the hospitality indus- 
try, subject to the continuation of a positive environment for them in 
the future Yet the proper balance of rewards and risks will be essen- 
tial in identifying prime targets. At this time, everyone seems to be 
watching Denny's and ARA to see if their deals prove successful. Should 
that be the case, other suitable candidates among hospitality firms are 
likely to follow suit, hoping to benefit from the potential rewards of 
LBOs. 
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